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Public Aid to Private Schools: Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan
In 1974 the New York State Legislature enacted a statute providing
direct financial reimbursements to nonpublic schools for actual costs in-
curred in complying with state-mandated reporting and testing require-
ments.' The Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty sued
to enjoin payment of the reimbursements to religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools and to have the statute declared unconstitutional as violating the
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. 2 A panel of three judges sitting for the district court of the Southern
District of New York found the statute in violation of the establishment
1. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 507. The statute provides in part:
§ 3. Apportionment. The commissioner shall annually apportion to each
qualifying school . . . an amount equal to the actual cost incurred by each
such school during the preceding school year for providing services required
by law to be rendered to the state in compliance with the requirements of the
state's pupil evaluation program, the basic educational data system, regents
examinations, the statewide evaluation plan, the uniform procedure for pupil
attendance reporting, and other similar state prepared examinations and re-
porting procedures.
§ 5. Maintenance of records. Each school which seeks an apportionment
pursuant to this act shall maintain a separate account or system of accounts
for the expenses incurred in rendering the services required by the state to be
performed .
§ 7. Audit. No application for financial assistance under this act shall be
approved except upon audit of vouchers or other documents by the commis-
sioner as are necessary to insure that such payment is lawful and proper.
The state department of audit and control shall from time to time examine
any and all necessary accounts and records of a qualifying school to which an
apportionment has been made pursuant to this act for the purpose of deter-
mining the cost to such school of rendering the services referred to in section
three of this act. If after such audit it is determined that any qualifying school
has received funds in excess of the actual cost of providing the services enu-
merated in section three of this act, such school shall immediately reimburse
the state in such excess amount.
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... Parts of the first amend-
ment were held to be applicable to the states by operation of the fourteenth amendment in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (freedom of speech, press, and religion); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion and speech); and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939) (freedom of speech and press).
For cases discussing the permissible scope of government aid to sectarian schools under
the establishment clause, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon,
413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a discussion of other issues arising under the estab-
lishment clause, see cases cited in notes 10-19 infra.
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clause because it had the "primary effect of advancing religion."' 3 On di-
rect appeal4 the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for a
determination in light of its decision in Wolman v. Walter.5 On remand
the district court, citing the Supreme Court's relaxation in Wolman of ear-
lier constitutional restrictions on state aid to sectarian schools,6 found that
the reimbursements provided by the statute did not constitute an advance-
ment of religion.7 An appeal again was made to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed: The statute providing for direct cash re-
imbursement to nonpublic sectarian schools for actual costs incurred in
complying with state-mandated services is not a violation of the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment because it has a secular legislative pur-
pose, has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 100 S. Ct. 840, 63
L. Ed. 2d 94 (1980).
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Although the prohibition against the establishment of religion was a sig-
nificant concern of the framers of our Constitution,8 the Supreme Court
has considered the boundaries of the establishment clause only within the
last forty years.9 The cases before the Court have encompassed a broad
range of topics, including prayers and Bible reading in public schools, I0
3. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 414 F. Supp. 1174, 1178
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The case is currently styled with Edward Regan as the defendant because
he succeeded Arthur Levitt as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York. The
three-judge panel was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1976) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2283-2284 (1976)).
4. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the district court decision by direct
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). The Court vacated and remanded without
opinion. 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
5. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). In Wolman the Court upheld an Ohio statute that provided
free standardized testing and scoring services to nonpublic schools. See notes 55-65 infra
and accompanying text.
6. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), discussed at notes 45-54 infra and ac-
companying text.
7. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 461 F. Supp. 1123, 1129
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). The two-to-one decision contained a vigorous dissent by Judge Ward. Id.
at 1131.
8. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28-74 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(description of the historical foundation of the establishment clause); J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 850 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
J. NOWAK]; 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1051-52,
1088-89 (1971). For a discussion of the history of the establishment clause and Thomas
Jefferson's key role in its construction, see Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A
Historical Examination ofthe Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 645.
9. See Boles, The Burger Court & Parochial Schools.- A Study in Law, Politics & Educa-
tional Reality, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 459 (1975); Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian
Schools.- A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783 (1978); Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d
1147 (1974).
10. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible readings in public
schools unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer programs in schools
unconstitutional).
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"released time" programs," parochial teacher salary reimbursements,12
tuition reimbursements and tax credits, 13 aid to nonpublic colleges and
universities, 14 tax exemptions for religious organizations,' 5 construction
grants for religious hospitals, 16 Sunday closing laws,' 7 free exercise of reli-
gion, 18 and interference in church ecclesiastical matters. 19
I . See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (permitted student absences from
school for religious services held elsewhere); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (rejected program allowing student absences from class to attend reli-
gious instruction conducted in a public school).
12. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (rejected reimbursement to non-
public schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other materials used in secular classes);
Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (decided with Lemon) (invalidated a Rhode Island
statute reimbursing teacher salaries); Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1147, 1184-86 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (invalidated cigarette tax funding
reimbursements to parents for portion of nonpublic school tuition); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (held unconstitutional tuition
reimbursement grants and income tax benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic
schools); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.) (denied deduction
from parents' taxable income for each child attending nonpublic schools), afd mem., 442
U.S. 907 (1979); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn.
1978) (permitted deduction from taxable income for expenses incurred by parents for their
children attending both public and nonpublic schools); Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp.
744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (invalidated tax credit for parents with excessive educational expenses
because the class of beneficiaries was primarily sectarian), afl'dmem sub nom. Grit v. Wol-
man, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). See also Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church
and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARV. L. REV. 696 (1979); Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1147,
1188-90 (1974).
14. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upheld noncategorical grants
to nonpublic colleges and universities because the grants did not constitute an establishment
of religion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (permitted revenue bond aid for private
college facilities not to be used for religious purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971) (upheld Higher Education Facilities Act providing grants for construction of private
college facilities not to be used for religious purposes); Smith v. Board of Governors, 429 F.
Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C.) (validated tuition and financial assistance to students at religiously
affiliated colleges), affd mem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977); see J. NOWAK, supra note 8, at 858-61;
Boles, supra note 9, at 465-67; Annot., 95 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1979); Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1147,
1186-87 (1974).
15. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court upheld tax exemptions to
religious organizations for property used exclusively for religious worship. The statute also
included exemptions for educational and charitable institutions. See also Annot., 7 A.L.R.
Fed. 548 (1971).
16. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (permitted public funding for construction
of hospital building run by Roman Catholic nuns). See also 42 U.S.C. § 254c(c) (1976),
which authorizes grants to public and nonprofit private entities to plan and develop commu-
nity health centers.
17. The purpose of the Sunday closing laws is to provide a uniform day of rest and
therefore does not violate the establishment clause. See Gallagher-v. Crown Kosher Super
Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Annot., 37
L. Ed. 2d 1147, 1207-11 (1974).
18. The disqualification of a person from unemployment compensation because she re-
fused to work on Saturday, in accordance with her religious beliefs, imposed an unconstitu-
tional burden on the free exercise of her religion. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
see J. NOWAK, supra note 8, at 871-94.
19. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (state supreme
court improperly interfered with decision of hierarchical church); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (property
dispute between local and general church involving ecclesiastical doctrine). The Supreme
Court has made it clear in these decisions that civil courts are not to determine matters of
ecclesiastical cognizance.
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Everson v. Board of Education20 is the recognized forerunner in cases
involving public aid to sectarian schools. The plaintiff-taxpayers 2' in Ever-
son claimed that an authorized reimbursement to parents for bus transpor-
tation costs of their children to and from school was an establishment of
religion to the extent that it reimbursed parents with children in Catholic
schools. The Court upheld the reimbursement as a general welfare pro-
gram that benefited all students and contributed no money to the relig-
iously affiliated schools. 22 The result was perplexing because the Court
resurrected Thomas Jefferson's "high and impregnable wall" between
church and state yet held that the New Jersey statute did not breach that
wall.23 The decision served, nevertheless, as a foundation for later cases
that opened further the door to public aid.24
Twenty-one years after Everson the Supreme Court addressed a related
issue under the establishment clause in Board of Education v. Allen. 25 The
Court in Allen utilized a two-prong test to determine the constitutionality
of state involvement with religious institutions under the establishment
clause: " '[There must be [both] a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.' "26 Relying on Ev-
erson, the Allen Court upheld a New York statute providing for the free
loan of textbooks to all students in grades seven through twelve, including
those in nonpublic sectarian schools.2 7 Acknowledging that the Court
20. 330 U.S. I (1947). For a discussion of this decision, see Kauper, Everson P. Boardof
Education.- A Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 307 (1973).
21. Although this case involved state taxpayers, the Supreme Court upheld the right of
federal taxpayers to challenge federal government aid to religiously affiliated schools under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241e (1976) (repealed
1978), in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). But cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923) (federal taxpayer lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of federal taxation for
failure to allege direct injury).
22. 330 U.S. at 18.
23. Id. Justice Jackson, dissenting, stated:
[T]he undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising
separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion
yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. The case which
irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented."
Id. at 19.
But see Comment, supra note 8, at 645, 650, 652, 658. The author indicates that Jeffer-
son's "high and impregnable wall" metaphor may be interpreted too literally by today's
courts. He suggests that in fact Jefferson was concerned primarily about federal interference
and would consent to more flexible religious liberty, tolerance, and accommodation at the
state level.
24. See cases cited at note 2 supra.
25. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
26. Id. at 243 (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). The Allen
Court borrowed the two-prong test from School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
The Schempp Court had held that no state law or school board could require that passages
from the Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be recited in public schools. The Court
cited Everson as its authority, articulating the purpose-effect test for determining the validity
of any issue under establishment clause scrutiny. For a discussion of further developments
of this test, see notes 32, 35-36 infra and accompanying text.
27. 392 U.S. at 243. The fact that the program applied to all children without regard to
religious affiliation was decisive. Id. at 241-43. Subsequent cases permitting loan programs
include Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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"has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious in-
struction and secular education, ' '28 it therefore rejected the contention that
secular textbooks would be instrumental in teaching religion. 29 Justice
Black, however, who authored the opinion in Everson, called the decision
a "flat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments." 30
In Walz v. Tax Commission3' the Supreme Court, upholding property
tax exemptions for religious organizations, refined the two-prong test for
constitutionality enunciated in Allen by adding a third prong: "that the
end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion."'32 This purpose-effect-entanglement test became firmly estab-
lished in Lemon v. Kurtzman .33 The Court in Lemon declared unconstitu-
One commentator has stated, "[I]t appears that Allen will not be reexamined and that these
text book programs will be upheld on the basis of stare decisis." J. NOWAK, supra note 8, at
856. But cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (unconstitutional to lend textbooks to
children attending private schools that racially discriminate); Marburger v. Public Funds for
Pub. Schools, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973) (reimbursement for money spent on textbooks
to parents of nonpublic school students violates the first amendment), aff'd mem., 417 U.S.
961 (1974); Dickman v. School Dist., 366 P.2d 533 (Or. 1961) (free use of textbooks to all
pupils violates state constitution prohibiting public money going to the benefit of religious
institutions; the use of textbooks was found to be inextricably connected with the teaching of
religious concepts), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962). See also Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 986
(1964).
The first Supreme Court textbook loan case was Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370 (1930). Cochran's effect on Allen was minimal, however, because the issue in
Cochran was whether the state textbook loan program violated the fourteenth amendment
as a taking of private property, that is taxes, for private use. The establishment clause issue
was not raised.
28. 392 U.S. at 245 (citing with approval Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)); see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775
(1973). Contra Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1688-91
(1969). Freund argues against the theory of separable functions because the theory contra-
venes the very purpose and philosophy for which parochial schools were established. For
later developments on the separability theory, see note 51 infra and accompanying text.
29. 392 U.S. at 248.
30. Id at 250 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas supported Justice Black in a dis-
sent that cited numerous examples of textbooks containing explicit religious references that
nevertheless qualify under the program. Id. at 257-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas also observed that "[a] parochial school textbook may contain many, many more
seeds of creed and dogma than a prayer. Yet we struck down in Engel P. Vitale .. .an
official New York prayer for its public schools. ... Id. at 257 (citation omitted). In the
Engel case Justice Douglas admitted that the Everson decision in which he participated may
have exceeded the first amendment bounds. 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
31. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
.32. Id. at 674. For a discussion of Walz, see Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the
Religious Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MicH. L. REV. 179 (1970), and note 15 supra.
See also J. NOWAK, supra note 8, at 854-55, 863-68. The Court has accepted this three-
prong test as a basis upon which to judge the constitutionality of establishment clause cases.
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235-36 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works,
426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973). Drafters of legislation have rarely had difficulty with the secular
purpose requirement. In only one case, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), has the
Court found that a statute had a primarily religious purpose.
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see Note, Lemon v. Kurtzman: First Amendment Religion
Clauses Reexamined, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 330 (1971). One commentator regards the Lemon -
DiCenso cases, decided in the same opinion, as the start of a Supreme Court shift away from
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tional a statute providing reimbursements to nonpublic schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and materials used in teaching secular sub-
jects because the payments involved an excessive entanglement of state
with church.34 The Lemon Court based its finding of excessive entangle-
ment in part on the fear of "political division along religious lines,"' 35 a
concern that at least one Justice has since used as a fourth prong to the
establishment clause test.36 The application of the excessive entanglement
prong was restricted when the Court in Hunt v. McNair37 discerned a dis-
tinction between religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools and
colleges and universities. According to the Court, colleges and universities
were not substantially oriented toward a sectarian purpose and their edu-
cation was not as likely to be permeated with religious indoctrination. 38
The Court has used the distinction to justify substantial aid to institutions
of higher education. 39
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,40
decided the same day as Hunt, the Court rejected a statutory attempt to
provide maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools because the inevitable effect was to subsidize and thus ad-
vance the religious mission of sectarian schools.4 1 Similarly, in Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty4 2 the Court refused to
validate a New York statute reimbursing nonpublic schools for state-
mandated testing services. Under the New York statutory scheme in Lev-
itt, the payments were to be made on a per pupil allotment basis and in-
cluded reimbursement for the preparation, administration, and grading of
the public aid advances made in Everson and Allen. Young, Implementation of Wolman, 24
CATH. LAW. 277, 279 (1979). See also Sanders v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn.
1970), afdmem., 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
34. 403 U.S. at 609.
35. Id. at 622. One author has stated: "While political debate and division is normally
a wholesome process for reaching viable accommodations, political division on religious
lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall." Freund,
supra note 28, at 1692.
36. Justice Brennan, who supported the textbook loan program in Allen, dissented from
the Court's approval of a similar program in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), because
of the "political divisiveness" factor set forth in Lemon. Id. at 374 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
37. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). The Hunt Court upheld the issuance of state revenue bonds
benefiting a Baptist college.
38. Id. at 746. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, derived the distinction from the
plurality opinion in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1973). In Tilton Justice White
declined the distinction, stating: "It is enough for me that the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment are financing a separable secular function of overriding importance in order to
sustain the legislation here challenged." Id. at 664 (White, J., concurring).
39. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
40. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
41. Id. at 774. The Court also rejected tuition grants for students from low-income
families and tax credits to parents for the same reason. The decision bears out the distinc-
tion made in Hunt. See notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text. For further discussion of
Nyquist, see Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 247
(1975); Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education After Nyquist and Sloan." Can a Constitu-
tional System Be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 895 (1974).
42. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
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teacher-prepared tests. The Court first criticized the statute as an imper-
missible aid to religion because it failed to provide a means of assuring
that the payments were for solely secular services. 43 Additionally, the
Court feared that teacher-prepared tests would be "drafted with an eye,
unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts
of the sponsoring church." 44
Meek v. Pillenger 45 represented a strict application of the purpose-effect-
entanglement test and dispelled any notions that judicial leniency might be
practiced in reviewing state aid statutes.46 In Meek the Court rendered
several opinions that together upheld a textbook loan program to school
students47 but invalidated a loan program for instructional materials and
equipment.48 According to the Court, the latter was distinguishable from
the textbook program because the materials and equipment were lent di-
rectly to the qualifying nonpublic elementary and secondary schools and
therefore had "the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion
because of the predominantly religious character of the schools benefiting
from the Act."'49 The Court substantially modified its earlier statement 5°
that sectarian schools had separable religious and secular purposes by stat-
ing that the two were "inextricably intertwined."' 5' Finally, the Court in-
validated a provision for auxiliary services 52 provided to students on the
nonpublic school premises because being on the premises could lead to an
"intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state,"' 53 and be-
43. Id. at 479-80. The Court quoted from its decision in Nyquist to support its reason-
ing. In neither instance, however, did it wholly reject direct payments to sectarian schools.
Rather, emphasis was placed on the failure to restrict payments exclusively to secular pur-
poses.
44. Id at 480. Justice White dissented without opinion. Id. at 482.
45. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). For an in-depth discussion of the case, see Buchanan, supra
note 9, at 809-12; Skelly, Meek v. Pittenger. Will It Precipitate a Solution?, 20 CATH. LAW.
335 (1974).
46. One commentator termed Meek "the most harsh decision ... ever rendered by the
Supreme Court of the United States with respect to aid to nonpublic school pupils." Young,
supra note 33, at 280.
47. 421 U.S. at 359. Justice Brennan would have invalidated the textbook program on
the basis of Lemon. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. Citing Allen for support,
Justice Stewart emphasized that the program benefited all students regardless of the school
they attended and that the financial benefit went to the parents of the children who were
required to buy the books, not to the school. 421 U.S. at 360 n.8, 361.
48. 421 U.S. at 363.
49. Id
50. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
51. 421 U.S. at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)). The Court used this rationale to support its rejection of the proposed material
and equipment loan program. Since Allen used the separability argument, in part, to justify
allowing the textbook loan program, it is difficult to understand how Meek proceeded to
validate a textbook loan program based on Allen without making any reference to Allen's
recognition that religious schools pursue both secular education and religious instruction.
See generally 2 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 654 (1950); Freund,
supra note 28, at 1688-89.
52. The services consisted of remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling
and testing, and speech and hearing services performed by a professional staff supplied by
the Secretary of Education.
53. 421 U.S. at 370.
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cause the appropriation process for such services created recurrent oppor-
tunity for "political fragmentation and division along religious lines."'54
Wolman v. Walter55 presented a divergence of views, as had Meek, in
four separate opinions, reflecting the Court's "kaleidoscopic pattern of
conjunctive and disjunctive opinions" as "evidence of conceptual disar-
ray."' 56 The Ohio statute upheld in Wolman included the refinements pre-
scribed by the Meek Court in that the therapeutic, guidance, and remedial
services, for example, were provided away from the nonpublic school
premises.57 The Court permitted on-premises diagnostic health services
provided by public employees because there was little likelihood for the
intrusion of sectarian views.5 8 To support its position the Court cited
Lemon's discussion of Allen and Everson, recognizing the constitutionality
of public health services when provided in common to all students. 59 Al-
though the Court upheld a textbook loan program in Wolman,60 it invali-
dated a program for lending instructional materials and equipment similar
to that in Meek 61 and likewise rejected a field trip funding program.62
More importantly, the Court approved a provision for supplying standard-
ized tests and scoring services without charge to the students through the
nonpublic schools. 63 In Levitt the Court had invalidated a similar statute
because the tests were teacher-prepared and thus susceptible to the incul-
cation of religious ideas. 64 The Ohio statute had rectified this deficiency
by requiring that the drafting and scoring of tests be done by nonpublic
school personnel. 65 By upholding the staridardized test and scoring provi-
54. Id. at 372.
55. 433 U.S. 229 (1977); see Young, supra note 33; Comment, Wolman v. Walter andthe
Continuing Debate over State Aid to Parochial Schools, 63 IOWA L. REV. 543 (1977); Note,
Public Aid to Parochial Elementary and Secondary Schools After Wolman v. Walter, 42 ALB.
L. REV. 701 (1978).
56. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 810.
57. 433 U.S. at 244 n.12. Providing the services off the nonpublic school premises was
sufficient for the Court to hold that the services did not advance religion or involve an
excessive entanglement of church with state. Id at 248.
58. Id at 244.
59. Id at 242. Consider also Justice Marshall's view favoring general welfare, nonideo-
logical services for all students. Id at 259 (Marshall, J., concurnng in part, dissenting in
part). See also Freund, supra note 28, at 1691.
60. 433 U.S. at 238.
61. Id at 250-51. Although the Ohio statute provided that the materials would be lent
directly to the student to comply with Meek's invalidation of materials lent to the school, the
Court rejected the statute because it was impossible to separate the secular from the sectar-
ian educational function in the use of the materials. As a result, the concept of aid to the
student rather than to the school prevails for textbooks, but, according to the Court, to vali-
date material and equipment loan programs merely because of a "technical change in legal
bailee" from the school to the student "would exalt form over substance" when the state aid
inevitably supports the religious role of the schools. Id.
62. Id at 254. The Court premised this finding on a parallel comparison of field trips
and maps and charts. To illustrate the confusing distinctions, the district court upheld the
field trip provision by comparing it to the bus fare reimbursements in Everson. Wolman v.
Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113, 1124-25 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
63. 433 U.S. at 241.
64. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480
(1973).
65. 433 U.S. at 239.
1268 [Vol. 34
NOTES
sions of the statute, the Court set the stage for Regan.
II. COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY V. REGAN
The principal issue presented in Regan was whether cash payments
made directly to nonpublic sectarian schools as reimbursement for actual
costs incurred in complying with state-mandated services violated the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment.66 Applying the established
purpose-effect-entanglement test to the New York statute's standard test-
ing provision, the Court pointed out that there was clearly a secular pur-
pose.67 Recognizing that the decision in Wolman v. Walter controlled,
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that although the instant
statute was different from the Ohio statute, "the differences [were] not of
constitutional dimension. ' 68 Although nonpublic school personnel were to
grade the state-mandated tests, the school "[did] not control the content of
the test or its result" 69 and, therefore, "there was no substantial risk that
the examinations could be used for religious educational purposes."'70 La-
beling the attendance recording and reporting services as ministerial func-
tions, the Court concluded that those services could not foster an
ideological outlook and, as a result, they also had a secular purpose and
effect.7'
In passing on the "effect" prong, the Court dispensed with the issue of
direct payments to the sectarian schools in spite of the prohibition of tax
support for sectarian schools pronounced in Everson.72 Recognizing that
other cases had invalidated direct aid to sectarian schools, 73 the Court
stated: "[Girading the secular tests furnished by the State in this case is a
function that has a secular purpose and primarily a secular effect. This
conclusion is not changed simply because the State pays the school for
performing the grading function."'74 After emphasizing the secular nature
of the grading function, the Court rejected the argument that all aid was
forbidden because aid to one aspect of a religious institution allowed that
66. 100 S. Ct. at 844, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 98-99.
67. Id. at 847, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 102.
68. Id., 63 L. Ed. 2d at 103. The admitted distinction of the New York statute is that it
provides for a direct cash reimbursement to the nonpublic schools while the statute in Wol-
man provide only for the tests and scoring services.
69. Id. at 848, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 104 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 240).
70. 100 S. Ct. at 848, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 104.
71. Id.
72. 330 U.S. 1 ( 1947); see notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. The Everson Court
stated: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion." 330 U.S. at 16.
73. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1975); Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968). In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), cited by the Regan
Court as support, the Court stated that "the schools, rather than the children, truly are the
recipients of the service and, as this Court has recognized, this fact alone may be sufficient to
invalidate the program as impermissible direct aid." Id at 253.
74. 100 S. Ct. at 848, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 104-05.
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institution to apply the freed resources to religious ends.75
In comparing the existing statute to an earlier version, the Court further
found that the statute did not give rise to excessive entanglement. 76
Whereas the earlier statute had no method for auditing expenditure of
public funds to ensure that the funds were sufficiently restricted to secular
uses, the legislature had enacted the new statute with specific provision for
state auditing procedures. 77 The Court found that these procedures were
not an excessive government entanglement with religion because the reim-
bursable services were discrete and clearly identifiable. 7 Moreover, the
reimbursement program was routine, with little cost variance among simi-
larly sized schools, and therefore was subject to simple supervision. 79 Fi-
nally, the Court relegated the political divisiveness factor of the
entanglement prong to a footnote, finding no merit in that contention. 80
Addressing the claim that the decision in Meek prohibited all aid to
sectarian schools, Justice White stated that the decision should be read
more narrowly 8' to permit programs that do not have the primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aims of nonpublic schools. 82 He carefully avoided
overruling Meek, stating that the district court properly put Meek and
Wolman together to sustain the reimbursement program because the pro-
gram had been shown to serve a secular end without risk of transmitting
religious views.83
In contrast to Justice White's assertion that the New York statute posed
no constitutional differences to the statute approved in Wolman, Justice
Blackmun, 84 the author of the Wolman decision, maintained that the
"direct financial assistance provided by Chapter 507 differs significantly
from the types of state aid to religious schools approved by the Court in
Wolman v. Walter."85 Justice Blackmun concluded that "[the statute], by
providing substantial financial assistance directly to sectarian schools, has
a primary effect of advancing religion" 86 and cited three instances of the
Court's rejection of such assistance. 87 Furthermore, the reimbursements
75. Id at 849, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 105.
76. Id at 844-46, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 99-102. The predecessor to ch. 507 was challenged in
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), discussed at
notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
77. 100 S. Ct. at 846, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 101.
78. Id. at 850, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 106.
79. Id
80. Id. at 850 n.8, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 106-07 n.8. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
243 n.l I (1977), in which the Court discussed the political divisiveness factor only in a foot-
note. One commentator who has claimed that Wolman reflected a retreat from the political
divisiveness argument, can find support for that theory in Regan. See Young, supra note 33,
at 288.
81. 100 S. Ct. at 850-51, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
82. Id at 851, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
83. Id
84. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Blackmun in dissent.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 853, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id at 854, 63 L. Ed. 2d at I11.
87. Id at 851-52, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 108. Justice Blackmun cited Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973) (tuition expense reimbursements); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
1270 [Vol. 34
NOTES
covered costs that nonpublic schools must incur to secure accreditation
from the state and, therefore, the reimbursements necessarily aided the
sectarian school enterprise as a whole. 88 Finally, Justice Blackmun stated
that state surveillance of the program and the system of reimbursement
fostered excessive government entanglement with religion. 89
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, stated his belief that the direct
subsidies to the sectarian schools violated the establishment clause90 and
that the "high and impregnable wall between church and state" should be
resurrected. 9' He criticized the Court's decision as "but another in a long
line of cases making largely ad hoc decisions about what payments may or
may not be constitutionally made to nonpublic schools."' 92 The numerous
cases heard by the Supreme Court dealing with this establishment clause
issue lend credence to Justice White's contention.
III. CONCLUSION
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York
statute providing direct cash reimbursements to nonpublic sectarian
schools. The Court applied a three-prong test for constitutionality and
concluded that the statute had a secular purpose, had a primary effect that
neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and did not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. Although the Court relied on its decision in
Wolman v. Walter, in which it had sustained legislation providing testing
materials alone to the schools, Regan represents a departure from Wolman
and preceding cases by approving cash payments made directly to the non-
public schools. Earlier cases had rationalized granting aid because it bene-
fited the students rather than the nonpublic school, but Regan indicates
that aid that inures to the benefit of the nonpublic school also will be al-
lowed if a purely secular purpose can be demonstrated that presents no
threat of the transmission of religious doctrines. Thus, state legislatures
can anticipate a more lenient degree of scrutiny for nonpublic school aid
legislation than has been experienced in the past. Nonetheless, no clear
standards for drafting such legislation have evolved from the Supreme
Court decisions so that evaluation of state statutes will continue to be ad
hoc.
Patrick C Sargent
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenance and repair programs, tuition grants); and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salary supplements and secular education
"purchase" contracts).
88. 100 S. Ct. at 854, 63 L. Ed. 2d at I11-12.
89. Id., 63 L. Ed. 2d at 112.
90. Id. at 855-56, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 113-14.
91. Id at 856, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 114.
92. Id. at 855, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 113.
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